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We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via
voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for participatory bud-
geting without an exogenously available budget, as well as donor coordination when interpreting charities
as public projects and donations as contributions. Our aim is to identify a mutually beneficial distribution of
the individual contributions. In the preference aggregation problem that we study, agents report linear utility
functions over projects together with the amount of their contributions, and the mechanism determines a
socially optimal distribution of the money. We identify a specific mechanism—the Nash product rule—which
picks the distribution that maximizes the product of the agents’ utilities. This rule is Pareto efficient, and we
prove that it satisfies attractive incentive properties: the Nash rule spends an agent’s contribution only on
projects the agent finds acceptable, and it provides strong participation incentives. We also discuss issues of
strategyproofness and monotonicity.
1 INTRODUCTION
Many cities run participatory budgeting programs, in which they set aside a fraction of their budget
and allow their residents to vote for project proposals—such as school renovations, park construc-
tion, or accessibility additions—usually using an online voting interface. This process allows city
governments to discover which projects the public cares most about, and thus can lead to a more
efficient use of the budget [Cabannes, 2004].
In a city, there is an authority which provides an exogenous budget to be spent. For other com-
munities without such a budget, a similar system could help determine the best public projects to
implement, but these projects will need to be funded via voluntary monetary contributions from
community members. Examples of such communities include residents of an apartment complex
(who want to coordinate spending on gardening in a courtyard, or on cleaning services), home-
owners on a city street (to coordinate tree care, snow removal, or security patrols), or student clubs
in a university (to coordinate funding for events and meet-ups). A simple solution for these use
cases is to set up an account for each proposed project and invite community members to con-
tribute to projects as they wish. But this can lead to Pareto dominated outcomes. For example, in
an apartment complex consisting of several buildings, residents might each give to projects spe-
cific to their own building (because for each individual, those projects provide the greatest benefit),
when all residents would agree that it would be better to pool the money for projects benefiting
the entire complex. To discover this kind of improvement, a voting-based system seems promising:
if agents report their preferences to a mechanism, it can aggregate the preferences to identify a so-
cially optimal funding scheme. Our aim is to develop the theory of such systems, and to show that
a mechanism based on maximizing the Nash product, that is, the product of the agents utilities,
provides remarkably strong incentives for community members to contribute financially.
The public projects funded by these voting-based funding systems could, in particular, be chari-
ties. Many companies run programs to encourage their employees to give charitably. For example,
Microsoft runs an annual charity matching program, and in 2019, employees donated a total of
$181 million to charities.1 Donations to charities have the characteristics of public projects, since
1 https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/philanthropies/employee-engagement
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each donor prefers more money being allocated to charities she perceives as impactful. A voting-
based system like the one wewill propose can help the employees of a company to coordinate their
giving, and thereby identify a more efficient money distribution. The system can also be used in
higher-stakes applications involving major philanthropic foundations. Notably, the Open Philan-
thropy Project, which grants more than $100 million a year to various organizations, has called on
academics to develop mechanisms to combine different staff members’ views on the most effective
giving opportunities, and also to help coordinate the giving of different philanthropic organiza-
tions [Muehlhauser, 2017]. Interest in donor coordination mechanisms has also been expressed in
the effective altruism community [Peters, 2019].
We imagine the typical user experience in a funding system as follows. Users are presented
with a list of proposed public projects. Among these, each user designates an arbitrary number of
projects to be acceptable, meaning that the user will be satisfied with a distribution as long as the
mechanism directs her contribution to these projects. Optionally, the user can specify fine-grained
preferences among acceptable projects; in this paper we will allow cardinal utilities which are lin-
ear and weakly increasing in the amount spent on a project and are additive between projects.
(Unlike some other works on participatory budgeting, we focus on divisible projects that can use
an arbitrary amount of funding; this model is particularly suitable for charities.) Finally, the user
is asked to commit a monetary amount to contribute to the funding system, and this money is
transferred to the clearinghouse. The mechanism then aggregates the submitted preference infor-
mation, decides how much money each project should receive, and then disburses the collected
contributions to the projects accordingly.
As described, this system with pre-collected contributions requires the participants to trust that
the system will in fact pay out the collected money (and not steal it). Our discussion is also ap-
plicable when this trust cannot be established (or when decentralization is desired); in such cases,
we can interpret the mechanism output as recommendations to the agents about how they should
distribute their contribution. However, this comes with the risk that participants will not follow
these recommendations, and thereby jeopardize the efficiency and fairness properties of the mech-
anism’s overall distribution.
While many preference aggregation mechanisms are imaginable, we will focus on a specific
mechanism called the Nash product rule and argue that it is remarkably well-adapted to the appli-
cations we have outlined. This mechanism performs a type of social welfare maximization. Specif-
ically, it selects a distribution δ of the overall collected contributions which maximizes the prod-
uct of voters’ utilities, with voters weighted by the size of their contribution. A voter i’s utility
in distribution δ is defined as ui (δ ) :=
∑
x ∈Ai ui (x)δ (x), where Ai is the set of projects accept-
able to i , ui (x) is the utility per unit of money that i assigns to project x , and δ (x) is the amount
spent on x . (The formal definition implicitly sets the utility of unacceptable projects to 0.) Then
the optimization objective will be
∏
i ∈N ui (δ )Ci , where Ci is the size of i’s contribution. The idea
of maximizing the product of voter utilities originates in the Nash bargaining solution, which
is why we refer to this mechanism as the Nash product rule. The Nash product has recently be-
come popular among researchers in various fields, including in the allocation of indivisible private
items [Caragiannis et al., 2016], committee elections [Lackner and Skowron, 2018], and participa-
tory budgeting [Fain et al., 2016, 2018]. In all these areas, the Nash rule satisfies strong fairness
and proportionality properties appropriate to the setting.
Since we are considering amodel with voluntary contributions, certain incentive properties that
have not been studied in other models become crucial for us. For starters, given the interpretation
of voter preferences, it is important that the contribution of user i is only spent on projects that
are acceptable to i—otherwise, the user can justifiably complain that the money is being misused.
In the case where we interpret the mechanism output only as a recommendation, this property
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becomes essential, since a recommendation to send money to an unacceptable project is likely to
be ignored. We say that a distribution δ is implementable if we can decompose it as δ = δ1+ · · ·+δn
such that δi spends exactly Ci , and spends it only on projects acceptable to i . In Theorem 4.1, we
prove that the distribution selected by the Nash product is always implementable.
Ourmain result concerns participation incentives offered by theNash product; wewish to assure
agents that it is beneficial for them to contribute their money to the mechanism. This we achieve
if the utility of an agent weakly increases with her contribution, where the utility of agent i is
the utility i derives from the collective distribution minus the amount of money i contributes.
Thus, any additional money that i contributes has to be spent so that it generates a higher utility
for i than keeping the money and the utility generated by the remaining contributions must not
decrease. Consider for instance the mechanism that maximizes leximin welfare [see, e.g., Moulin,
2003] among all implementable distributions. This mechanism fails our condition, because it will
take additional money as an opportunity to increase the welfare of low-utility agents, who may
have interests different from i .We introduce an axiom called pooling participation, requiring that i’s
utility, upon contributing, is at least the utility i would have derived from others’ money had i not
participated, plus the worst-case utility i gets from spending her contribution on an acceptable
project.2 We establish in Theorem 4.2 that the Nash product rule satisfies pooling participation.
Our proof of this fact is rather involved, because we need to reason about the trajectory of the
maximizer of the Nash product as agent i’s contribution continuously increases. Using the Taylor
expansion of the Nash objective and a carefully chosen perturbation, we are able to estimate the
derivative of i’s utility as i’s contribution changes, which after an integration yields the result.
Since the Nash product rule maximizes a monotonic function of voter utilities, its outcome is
guaranteed to be Pareto efficient. This feature is important in order to gain user acceptance, and
to avoid sub-optimal outcomes such as those discussed earlier. While Pareto efficiency is often
considered a minimal condition, it can be difficult to achieve by mechanisms that need to satisfy
additional incentive properties. Implementation and pooling participation can very easily be satis-
fied by non-efficient mechanisms;3 the remarkable feature of the Nash product is that it provides
these incentive properties while ensuring Pareto efficiency. The Nash product is the only rule
known to us that is both Pareto efficient and satisfies pooling participation. While we can con-
struct other rules that are Pareto efficient and implementable, these are artificial, and Nash is the
only natural such rule that we are aware of.
While the Nash product rule is incentive-compatible in the sense of implementability and pool-
ing participation, it still allows for other strategic behavior. In particular, agents may have an
incentive to misrepresent their utility functions. Because the Nash product penalizes distributions
in which some agents obtain very low utility, it can be beneficial for agents to pretend to like pop-
ular projects less, or even to mark them as unacceptable. This will make the Nash product rule
worry that those agents will be underserved, and thus increase the funding of other projects ac-
ceptable to them. Unfortunately, by a result due to Hylland [1980, Thm. 2], every Pareto efficient
mechanism will be vulnerable to misrepresentation of preferences. In Section 5, we sharpen this
result by showing that every (symmetric) mechanism that is Pareto efficient and implementable
can be manipulated by the same strategy effective in the case of the Nash product rule, namely by
understating one’s utilities. We additionally note that the Nash product rule fails a natural mono-
tonicity property, and we leave the intriguing open question whether there exists a mechanism
that is monotonic and matches the other axiomatic virtues of the Nash rule.
2We also consider a version with best-case spending, but show that this version is incompatible with Pareto efficiency.
3For example, by the uncoordinated “mechanism” that tells each user to direct her entire contribution to the project to
which she assigned the highest utility, without doing any aggregation of preferences.
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In Section 6, we discuss strengthened versions of implementability and pooling participation
that are appropriate for a utility model in which agents do not distinguish only between acceptable
and unacceptable projects, and when agents have maximally attractive outside options. While
these two stronger properties may be desirable in the context of donor coordination, we show
that each of them is incompatible with Pareto efficiency.
Overall, our discussion suggests that the Nash rule is a prime candidate for deployment in partic-
ipatory budgeting settings with voluntary contributions. It combines Pareto efficiency with strong
incentive properties, and as we will mention in Section 2, it also satisfies important fairness and
proportionality properties. Finally, the rule is simple to define, can be computed to arbitrary pre-
cision using convex programming, and because it is implementable, its distribution decisions can
be easily understood by users.
2 RELATED WORK
Participatory budgeting has mostly been studied under the assumption that the budget is provided
by an outside source (such as the city government); the recent literature on aggregation mecha-
nisms was surveyed by Aziz and Shah [2020]. In the most common model, projects come with a
fixed cost, and they can either be fully funded or not at all. For this model, researchers have stud-
ied issues of preference elicitation [Benade et al., 2017, Goel et al., 2019], monotonicity properties
[Talmon and Faliszewski, 2019], and proportionality concepts [Aziz et al., 2018, Fain et al., 2018].
In the case where each project has the same cost (the unit cost case), this model captures committee
elections, which have received much recent attention. The literature on committee elections com-
pares different voting rules, studies their winner determination problems, and considers axioms;
for an overview, see Faliszewski et al. [2017].
In a related model, the projects can receive an arbitrary amount of funding (like in our paper)
but the budget is still exogenous and of fixed size. In the computer science literature, the study
of this setting was initiated by Fain et al. [2016], who argued that allocations in Lindahl equilib-
rium [Foley, 1970] are particularly desirable. The Lindahl equilibrium is a market equilibrium in
an artificial market for public goods. In these markets, each agent faces personalized prices (usu-
ally interpreted as taxes) for the public goods, and in equilibrium each agent demands the same
bundle of public goods. Under standard assumption, Foley [1970] showed that a Lindahl equilib-
rium exists (by reduction to the Arrow–Debreu private goods case), and is Pareto efficient. He also
showed that equilibrium allocations are in the core: no coalition of agents can afford (using only a
fraction of the budget proportional to their size) an allocation that each coalition member prefers
to the equilibrium. For the case of additive linear utilities, Fain et al. [2016] proved that the Nash
product rule yields an allocation in Lindahl equilibrium, and hence is in the core.4 The core can be
interpreted as guaranteeing agents proportional representation: if a fraction of α% of voters assign
positive utility only to some set A′ of projects, then the Nash product rule will spend at least α%
of the budget on projects in A′.
Our model is also closely related to probabilistic social choice [see, e.g., Brandt, 2017]: a divi-
sion of a fixed budget among projects is the same as a probability distribution over alternatives.
Bogomolnaia et al. [2005] have studied the special case of dichotomous preferences in probabilistic
social choice and introduced several rules (including the Nash product rule). Their results can be in-
terpreted as results for participatory budgeting with projects that can receive an arbitrary amount
of funding and where each voter assigns only utilities of either 0 or 1 to projects. Later, Duddy
[2015] introduced another rule for this setting, and Aziz et al. [2019] undertook a more thorough
4This mirrors the canonical result that the Nash product yields an equilibrium in Fisher markets for private goods under
additive valuations [Eisenberg and Gale, 1959].
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axiomatic analysis. In particular, Aziz et al. [2019] showed that the Nash product rule guarantees
average fair share: for any group of α% of the voters which is cohesive (there is a project that they all
approve), for an average group member, the Nash product spends at least α% of the budget on ap-
proved projects. They also proved that Nash satisfies strict participation. This property, which was
introduced by Brandl et al. [2015], makes sense for the fixed-budget setting, but in our variable-
budget interpretation it is weak.5 Our main result that Nash satisfies pooling participation implies
Aziz et al.’s [2019] result.
The key difference between all of the above literatures and our model is that in our model,
the individual contributions to the endowment are owned by the agents. This suggests the def-
initions of the axioms of implementability and pooling participation, which—to the best of our
knowledge—have not been considered in previous work. On the other hand, as we already men-
tioned, the Nash product rule has featured prominently in many streams of research, and has been
shown to have desirable fairness and efficiency properties in many settings [e.g., Aziz et al., 2019,
Caragiannis et al., 2016, Conitzer et al., 2017, Fain et al., 2016, 2018].
Amajor application of ourmodel is for allocating donations to charities. Conitzer and Sandholm
[2004, 2011] have also considered this application from a mechanism design perspective. They let
agents incentivize other agents to donate more by devising “matching offers”, where a donation
is made conditional on how much other agents donate, and to which charities. Rather than using
matching offers, in our model, donations are incentivized by (implicitly) letting agents vote over
how others donate their money, and weighting votes by the size of the voter’s contribution.
3 MODEL AND AXIOMS
LetA be a finite set ofm projects (e.g., charities or joint activities) and N a finite set of n agents. For
each i ∈ N , agent i’s contribution is Ci ∈ R>0, giving rise to a total endowment ofC =
∑n
i=1Ci .
A distribution δ is a function that describes how some amountV (e.g., an individual contribution
or the entire endowment) is distributed among the projects, so δ : A→ R≥0 such that
∑
x ∈A δ (x) =
V . For convenience, wewrite distributions as linear combinations of projects, so thata+2b denotes
for distribution δ with δ (a) = 1 and δ (b) = 2. The set of all distributions of value V is denoted by
∆(V ). Each distribution of the endowment δ ∈ ∆(C) can be divided into n individual distributions
δi ∈ ∆(Ci ) such that δ =
∑
i ∈N δi . Clearly, the division of a distribution into individual distributions
is not unique.
Apart from her contribution, each agent possesses a utility function ui : A → R, where ui (a)
describes how much utility an agent derives if one unit of money goes to project a. So agent i’s
utility for a distribution δ ∈ ∆(C) is
ui (δ ) =
∑
x ∈A
δ (x) · ui (x).
A project is said to be acceptable by an agent if it gives her positive utility, and unacceptable oth-
erwise. We assume that the utility assigned to unacceptable projects is 0.6 We normalize utility
functions such that the utility assigned to least-preferred acceptable projects is 1. (In the special
case that an agent is completely indifferent, we label all projects as acceptable and so set all utilities
5For dichotomous preferences, strict participation implies that if before contributing, β% of others’ money was spent on
i ’s approved projects, then strictly more than β% of i ’s additional contribution will be spent on i ’s approved projects,
while others’ money is not spent in a worse way for i . On the other hand, our pooling participation ensures that if agent i
contributes money, all of it will be spent on i ’s approved projects, while again others’ money is not spent in a worse way
for i .
6If we allowed agents to differentiate between unacceptable projects, they could influence other agents’ distribution to
those projects, while being guaranteed to never have their own contributions spent on unacceptable projects. This would
lead to “bossiness”, so we prohibit this.
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker, and Warut Suksompong 6
to 1). A utility function ui is dichotomous if we have ui (x) ∈ {0, 1} for all x ∈ A, so that agent i
only distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable projects without further discriminating
between the acceptable ones. The type of an agent i is θi = (ui ,Ci ) and the set of all types Θ. A
profile θ = (θi )i ∈N ∈ ΘN assigns a type to every agent. We denote by θ−i the profile including all
agents but i . A mechanism f is a function mapping a profile θ to a distribution δ ∈ ∆(C).
We now discuss the main properties of distribution mechanisms that we are interested in. Recall
that the purpose of such mechanisms is to identify a high-quality distribution and to exploit any
synergies in the agents’ preferences. Thus, we aim for distributions that allocate a large portion of
the endowment to projects that many agents value highly. On the other hand, we have to ensure
that the distribution can be implemented even if agents are self-interested. In addition, it should
be beneficial for agents to participate in the process of pooling their resources, since the presence
of additional agents can only increase the potential for mutual benefits.
A minimal requirement for the first objective is Pareto efficiency (or Pareto optimality). Indeed,
if a mechanism produces a distribution so that we could reshuffle money between projects and
make every agent better off, it has not made full use of the potential for mutual gains.
Definition 3.1 (Efficiency). Let θ ∈ Θn be a type profile. A distribution δ ′ ∈ ∆(C) Pareto dominates
another distribution δ ∈ ∆(C) if ui (δ ′) ≥ ui (δ ) for all i ∈ N and ui (δ ′) > ui (δ ) for some i ∈ N . A
distribution δ ∈ ∆(C) is efficient if no distribution dominates it.
We say that a mechanism f is efficient if f (θ ) is efficient for all θ ∈ Θn .
Depending on the concrete application, the mechanismmight operate in a decentralized setting,
and may not be able to directly control the use of the agents’ contributions (for example, when a
donor coordination service does not actually collect money from its participants). In such cases,
the mechanism’s output δ is better understood as a recommendation to the agents about how they
should use their resources. We would then need to decompose δ into personalized recommenda-
tions δi ∈ ∆(Ci ), so that if every agent spends her money according to δi , we recover δ . In order
for the distribution to be implementable, it should ask every agent to spend her contributions
exclusively on acceptable projects.
Definition 3.2 (Implementability). Let θ ∈ Θn be a type profile. A distribution δ ∈ ∆(C) is imple-
mentable if it can be divided into individual distributions (δi )i ∈N with δi ∈ ∆(Ci ) for all i ∈ N and
δ =
∑
i ∈N δi such that for all i ∈ N , we have δi (x) > 0 only if ui (x) > 0.
We say that a mechanism f is implementable if f (θ ) is implementable for all θ ∈ Θn . Imple-
mentability thus refers to the implementation of payments in a decentralized setting rather than
an implementation in truthful strategies as often considered in mechanism design. In Section 6, we
discuss a strengthening of implementability which requires that δi (x) > 0 only if i has assigned
maximum utility to x , i.e., only if ui (x) ≥ ui (y) for all y ∈ A. However, this requirement turns out
to be too strong; it clashes with efficiency.
We cannot force agents to participate in the mechanism. Even when not participating, agents
still benefit from the projects funded by the participating agents; this fact reduces participation
incentives (a kind of free-riding). However, there is a downside to not participating: themechanism
only considers the utility functions of those who contribute to the mechanism. Thus, agents who
do not participate forego the opportunity to influence the spending of other agents.
To motivate the definition of our participation axiom, focus on agent i , and recall that we have
normalized i’s reported utilities so that the utility of each acceptable project is at least 1. Agent i
considers two possible actions:
(1) contribute 0 to the mechanism and instead spend the amountCi on some outside option that
gives i a utility of 1 per unit of money, for a total utility of ui (f (θ−i )) +Ci ;
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(2) contribute Ci to the mechanism, for a total utility of ui (f (θ )).
Pooling participation requires that i obtains at least as much utility when choosing action (2) than
when choosing (1).
Definition 3.3 (Pooling participation). A mechanism f satisfies pooling participation if for each
θ ∈ Θn and i ∈ N , ui (f (θ )) ≥ ui (f (θ−i )) +Ci .
While pooling participation is phrased as a choice between contributing 0 orCi > 0, it will also
imply a similar property saying that it is beneficial for agents to increase their contribution from
Ci to Ci + ∆; this implication holds for all reasonable rules that treat agents with the same utility
function as a single agent (like the Nash product rule does).
In Section 6, we again discuss a strengthening of pooling participation, where the quality of
the outside option is higher, so that i obtains utility ui (f (θ−i )) +Ci ·maxy∈A ui (y) when choosing
action (1). Again, this stronger version is incompatible with efficiency.7
4 THE NASH PRODUCT RULE
The Nash product, which refers to the product of agent utilities, is often seen as a compromise
between utilitarian and egalitarian welfare [Moulin, 1988]. Maximizing the Nash product has been
found to yield fair and proportional outcomes in many preference aggregation settings, and it also
turns out to be attractive in our context. Formally, it is defined as follows.
NASH (θ ) = argmax
δ ∈∆(C )
∏
i ∈N
(ui (δ ))Ci = argmax
δ ∈∆(C )
∑
i ∈N
Ci log (ui (δ )) . (Nash Product Rule)
The distribution NASH (θ )maximizes a sum of functions, namelyCi log(·), that are strictly increas-
ing in the agents’ utilities. Thus, it is efficient [see, e.g., Moulin, 1988].
A simple example of NASH for a type profile θ with two agents and two projects is shown in
Table 1. We have δ = NASH (θ ) = argmaxδ ∈∆(2) δ (a) · (δ (a) + 3 δ (b)) = 1.5 a + 0.5 b. Pooling
participation is satisfied in this example becauseu1(δ ) = 1.5 > 1 = u1(b)+1 = u1(NASH (θ−1))+C1
and u2(δ ) = 3 > 2 = u2(a) + 1 = u2(NASH (θ−2)) + C2. On the other hand, simply maximizing
utilitarian welfare—that is, the sum of individual utilities—in this example would result in δ ′ =
2 b, which violates both implementability, as project b is unacceptable for agent 1, and pooling
participation because agent 1 would prefer an outside option to participating in the mechanism.
In general,NASH can be efficiently approximated using convex programming [see, e.g., Bogomolnaia et al.,
2005]. However, asNASH can return distributions with irrational values (see θ ′ in Figure 1 for such
an example), its exact computation is not possible in general.
ui (a) ui (b) Ci
Agent 1 1 0 1
Agent 2 1 3 1
Table 1. Type profile θ = (θ1,θ2) with contributions C1 = C2 = 1 and NASH(θ) = 1.5 a + 0.5 b .
It is not obviouswhether the distribution returned byNASH is always implementable or ifNASH
satisfies pooling participation. We will deal with these questions in turn and find that the answer
in both cases is yes. The proof for pooling participation is rather involved.
7Note that implementability and pooling participation are logically independent properties, even when utilities are
dichotomous.
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The Nash distribution is the solution to an optimization problem, and thus satisfies the first-
order conditions of optimality. By manipulating these conditions, we can show that NASH is im-
plementable.8
Theorem 4.1. NASH satisfies implementability.
Proof. We have to show that there is a decomposition of NASH (θ ) into δi ∈ ∆(Ci ), i ∈ N , such
that
∑
i ∈N δi (x) = δ (x) for all x .
We consider the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions and write the Lagrangian as
L(δ , λ, µ1, . . . , µm) =
∑
i ∈N
Ci log (ui (δ )) + λ
(
C −
∑
x ∈A
δ (x)
)
+
∑
x ∈A
µxδ (x),
where λ ∈ R is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint ∑x ∈A δ (x) = C and µx ≥ 0 is the
multiplier for the constraint δ (x) ≥ 0.
Suppose δ is an optimal solution. By complementary slackness, we must have µx = 0 whenever
δ (x) > 0. Also, we must have ∂L/∂δ (x) = 0, that is, ∑i ∈N Ciui (x)/ui (δ ) − λ + µx = 0. By case
distinction based on whether δ (x) > 0, it follows that λδ (x) = ∑i ∈N Ciδ (x)ui (x)/ui (δ ) for all x ∈ A.
Hence,
λ ·C =
∑
x ∈A
λδ (x) =
∑
x ∈A
∑
i ∈N
Ciδ (x)ui (x)/ui (δ ) =
∑
i ∈N
Ciui (δ )/ui (δ ) =
∑
i ∈N
Ci = C .
So λ = 1, and hence
∑
i ∈N Ciui (x)/ui (δ ) = 1 for all x ∈ A such that δ (x) > 0.
Now, for each i ∈ N , define an individual distribution δi ∈ ∆(Ci )with δi (x) = Ciδ (x)ui (x)/ui (δ )
for all x ∈ A. Clearly, supp(δi ) ⊆ {a ∈ A : ui (a) > 0} and δi ∈ ∆(Ci ), since
∑
x ∈A δ (x)ui (x) = ui (δ ).
To see that δ =
∑
i ∈N δi , note that for x ∈ A with δ (x) = 0 we have δi (x) = 0 for all i ∈ N , and for
x ∈ A with δ (x) > 0, we have∑
i ∈N
δi (x) =
∑
i ∈N
Ciδ (x)ui (x)/ui (δ ) = δ (x)
∑
i ∈N
Ciui (x)/ui (δ ) = δ (x). 
By inspecting the proof, we see that the distribution δi of agent i even satisfies a stronger notion
of implementability: the fraction of her contribution that she gives to project x is proportional to
the utility δ (x)ui (x) she derives fromx in theNash distribution δ [see also Guerdjikova and Nehring,
2014]. So if for example, half of agent i’s utility ui (δ ) is due to the amount δ (x) spent on x , then
she transfers half of her contribution to x . Thus, given δ , agents can easily compute their indi-
vidual distributions without the need for a central clearinghouse to tell the agents their individual
distributions. Agents do not even need to know the other agents’ utility functions or contributions.
The proof that NASH satisfies pooling participation is technically involved and requires a num-
ber of lemmas, whose proofs we defer to the appendix. At a high level, we estimate the rate of
change of an agent’s utility as her contribution increases, and integrate this quantity as she goes
from not participating to participating in the mechanism to obtain the desired result. The esti-
mation entails expressing the logarithm of the utilities as a Taylor expansion and analyzing the
relationship between the change in an agent’s contribution and the change in these utilities at the
distribution returned by NASH .
Theorem 4.2. NASH satisfies pooling participation.
8This proof is similar to a result by Guerdjikova and Nehring [2014] who consider NASH with dichotomous preferences,
and establish an equivalent property in this restricted setting.
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Recall that we normalized utilities so that the utility assigned to least-preferred acceptable
projects is 1 and so that the utility assigned to unacceptable projects is 0. Formally, in order to prove
Theorem 4.2, we must show that for all θ ∈ Θn and i ∈ N , ui (NASH (θ )) ≥ ui (NASH (θ−i )) + Ci .
Consider the function д : Θn → ∆(1) with д(θ ) = NASH (θ )/Cθ for all θ ∈ Θn , where Cθ denotes
the sum of the contributions in θ . We will show that
ui (д(θ )) ≥ 1
Cθ
((Cθ −Ci )ui (д(θ−i )) +Ci ), (1)
which is equivalent to the inequality above for NASH .
Denote by Pθ ⊆ Rn the polytope of feasible utility profiles scaled by 1/Cθ , i.e., Pθ = {u(δ ) : δ ∈
∆(1)}. Note that Pθ is convex. ForU ∈ Pθ , let Fθ (U ) =
∑
i ∈N Ci logUi .
Lemma 4.3. For all θ ∈ Θn , Fθ has a unique maximizer U ∈ Pθ . Moreover, Ci ≤ Ui ≤ Cθumaxi for
all i ∈ N .
Since by Lemma 4.3, Fθ has a unique maximizer for all θ ∈ Θn , we can define the function
U : Θn → Rn≥0 that returns this unique maximizer. Observe thatU(θ ) ∈ Pθ for all θ ∈ Θn .
Lemma 4.4. U is continuous in CN on Rn>0 and Ui is weakly increasing inCi for all i ∈ N .
Lemma 4.5. For every θ ∈ Θn and U ∈ Pθ , there is ε > 0 such that for all dU ∈ Rn with |dU | ≤ ε
and U + dU ∈ Pθ , we have U + tdU ∈ Pθ for all t ∈ [0, 2].
The next three lemmas will be useful for analyzing error terms obtained in the main analysis.
Lemma 4.6. Let θ ∈ Θn , U = U(θ ), and dU ∈ Rn such that U + dU ∈ Pθ . Then,∑
i ∈N
Ci
dUi
Ui
≤ 0.
If also U − dU ∈ Pθ , then equality holds.
Lemma 4.7. Let θ ∈ Θn , x ∈ Rn , and α , β > 0 such that ∑i ∈N Cixi = 0 and −α ≤ xi ≤ β for all
i ∈ N . Then, ∑
i ∈N
Cix
2
i ≤ αβ
∑
i ∈N
Ci .
Lemma 4.8. For all µ ∈ (0, 2) there is ε∗ ∈ (0, 1)with the following property: For any Φ : [0, 2] → R
such that Φ(1) = maxt ∈[0,2] Φ(t) and
αt − (1 + ε)βt2 ≤ Φ(t) ≤ αt − (1 − ε)βt2,
for some α , β ≥ 0 and ε ∈ (0, ε∗) and all t ∈ [0, 2], it holds that α ≥ µΦ(1).
Proof of Theorem 4.2. We want to prove (1) with i = 1 as the focal agent. The first step, and
also the bulk of the proof, is to derive a lower bound on the derivative of U1(θ ) = u1(д(θ )) as a
function of C1 whenever U1(θ ) < 1. Then, integrating this derivative and using monotonicity of
U1 (see Lemma 4.4) gives (1).
Step 1. Let θ ∈ Θn such that U1(θ ) < 1 and U = U(θ ). Moreover, let µ ∈ (0, 2) and let ε∗ be such
that the conclusion of Lemma 4.8 holds; let ε ∈ (0, ε∗). Considering the Taylor expansion of the
logarithm, ε ′ > 0 exists such that for all i ∈ N and |r | < ε ′,log(Ui + r ) − logUi − rUi +
1
2
(
r
Ui
)2 ≤ ε4
(
r
Ui
)2
. (2)
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Now letC ′N ∈ Rn>0 such thatC ′1 = C1 + dC1 with 0 < dC1 < min{ε ′, ε(2+ε ) C1} andC ′i = Ci for all
i ∈ N \ {1}, and let θ ′ = (u,C ′). Consider the function ϕ : Rn → R defined on dU with |dU | < ε∗,
such that
ϕ(dU ) := Fθ ′(U + dU ) − Fθ (U ) − dC1 logU1 =
∑
i ∈N
Ci
dUi
Ui
+ dC1
dU1
U1
−ψ (dU ),
for someψ : Rn → R with
(1 − ε)1
2
∑
i ∈N
Ci
(
dUi
Ui
)2
≤ ψ (dU ) ≤ (1 + ε)1
2
∑
i ∈N
Ci
(
dUi
Ui
)2
.
The existence ofψ is guaranteed by (2) and the bound on dC1.
Now letU ′ = U(θ ′) and dU ′ = U ′ −U . Note that, since the only term in ϕ(dU ) that depends on
dU is Fθ ′(U + dU ), dU ′ maximizes ϕ among all dU ∈ Rn with U + dU ∈ Pθ . By Lemma 4.5, there
is ε ′′ > 0 such that, for all dU ∈ Rn with |dU | ≤ ε ′′ and U + dU ∈ Pθ , we have U + rdU ∈ Pθ
for all r ∈ [0, 2]. SinceU is continuous inCN by Lemma 4.4, |dU ′ | will be small if dC1 is small and
we can choose dC1 to be even smaller if necessary so that 2|dU ′| ≤ min(ε ′, ε ′′). Then, the function
Φ : [0, 2] → R with Φ(r ) = ϕ(rdU ′) is well-defined and satisfies the prerequisites of Lemma 4.8
with
α =
∑
i ∈N
Ci
dU ′i
Ui
+ dC1
dU ′1
U1
and β =
1
2
∑
i ∈N
Ci
(
dU ′i
Ui
)2
.
Hence, it follows from Lemma 4.8 that∑
i ∈N
Ci
dU ′i
Ui
+ dC1
dU ′1
U1
≥ µΦ(1).
Since U maximizes Fθ , by Lemma 4.6,
∑
i ∈N Ci
dU ′
i
Ui
≤ 0. It follows that
dC1
dU ′1
U1
≥ µΦ(1). (3)
Next, let δ = д(θ ). Let H1 =
∑
a∈A:u1(a)>0 δ (a) be the fraction spent on agent 1’s acceptable
projects, i.e., those that agent 1 assigns positive utility. Recall that U1 < 1, and so H1 < 1. Since
NASH satisfies the positive share property, i.e., it gives each agent positive utility, we have H1 > 0.
From 0 < H1 < 1, we get that δ (a) < 1 for all a ∈ A. Thus, for |t | > 0 small enough, take the
distribution δ t with δ t (a) = (1 + t)δ (a) for all a ∈ A with u1(x) > 0 and (1 − H11−H1 t)δ (a) for all
a ∈ A with u1(a) = 0. One can check that δ t ∈ ∆(1):∑
a∈A
δ t (a) =
∑
a∈A
u1(a)>0
(1 + t)δ (a) +
∑
a∈A
u1(a)=0
(1 − H11−H1 t)δ (a)
= (1 + t)
∑
a∈A
u1(a)>0
δ (a) + (1 − H11−H1 t)
∑
a∈A
u1(a)=0
δ (a)
= (1 + t)H1 + (1 − H11−H1 t)(1 −H1) = 1.
Let dU t = u(δ t ) −U . For |t | small enough, we have thatU + dU t ∈ Pθ andU −dU tθ ∈ Pθ . Indeed,
U + dU t = u(δ t ), and for the second statement we can perturb δ infinitesimally in the opposite
direction. This is a valid perturbation because δ (a) < 1 for all a ∈ A, and for a ∈ A such that
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δ (a) = 0 we have δ t (a) = δ (a). Thus, by Lemma 4.6, we have∑
i ∈N
Ci
dU ti
Ui
= 0.
So for sufficiently small |t |, we have
ϕ(dU t ) = dC1
dU t1
U1
−ψ (dU t ) ≥ dC1
dU t1
U1
− (1 + ε)1
2
∑
i ∈N
Ci
(
dU ti
Ui
)2
.
Since dU t1 = u1(δ t ) −U1 = (1+ t)U1 −U1, we have that
dU t1
U1
= t . Similarly, it follows that − H11−H1 t ≤
dU t
i
Ui
≤ t for all i ∈ N .
Now, by definition of H1, we haveU1 ≥ H1. Thus 1 −U1 ≤ 1 −H1. Hence − U11−U1 ≤ −
H1
1−H1 . Thus,
applying Lemma 4.7 with α = U1(1−U1) t , β = t , and xi =
dU t
i
Ui
, it follows that
ϕ(dU t ) ≥ dC1t − (1 + ε)1
2
U1Cθ
1 −U1
t2.
Now let t := 1−U1
U1Cθ
dC1. If dC1 is small enough, then t is also small enough and, recalling that dU
′
maximizes ϕ among all dU ∈ Rn with U + dU ∈ Pθ , we get
Φ(1) = ϕ(dU ′) ≥ ϕ(dU t ) ≥ 1
2
(1 − ε)1 −U1
U1Cθ
(dC1)2.
Thus, by (3), we get
dC1
dU ′1
U1
≥ µ
2
(1 − ε)1 −U1
U1Cθ
(dC1)2,
from which it follows from dC1 > 0 that
dU ′1 ≥
µ
2
(1 − ε)1 −U1
Cθ
dC1.
Since µ ∈ (0, 2) was arbitrary and ε > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small, it follows that
dU ′1 ≥
1 −U1
Cθ
dC1.
Step 2. Now let θ ∈ ΘN be arbitrary. We show (1). Let Cs
N
∈ RN such that Cs1 = s and Csi = Ci for
all i ∈ N \ {1}, θ s = (u,CsN ), and U˜(s) = U(θ s ). Let C ′1 = sup{s ∈ [0,C1] : U˜1(s) < 1}.
Case 1. Consider the case C ′1 = 0. By Lemma 4.4, U˜1 is monotonic in s , and so
U˜1(C1) ≥ U˜1(0) = 1
Cθ
(
(Cθ −C1)U˜1(0) +C1U˜1(0)
)
≥ 1
Cθ
(
(Cθ −C1)U˜1(0) +C1
)
which proves (1).
Case 2. IfC ′1 > 0, let ϵ ∈ (0,C ′1) be arbitrary. By Step 1, the lower right derivative of U˜1 at s ∈ (ϵ,C ′1)
is at least 1−U˜1(s)
Cθ−C1+s . Integrating this estimate from ϵ to C
′
1 yields
−
∫ C ′1
ϵ
∂U˜1(s)
∂s
1 − U˜1(s)
ds ≤ −
∫ C ′1
ϵ
1
Cθ −C1 + s
ds
from which we get
log(1 − U˜1(C ′1)) − log(1 − U˜1(ϵ)) ≤ −(log(Cθ −C1 +C ′1) − log(Cθ −C1 + ϵ)).
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Exponentiation yields
1−U˜1(C ′1)
1−U˜1(ϵ )
≤ Cθ−C1+ϵ
Cθ−C1+C ′1 . Since ϵ was arbitrary and U˜1 is monotonic, we get
1−U˜1(C ′1)
1−U˜1(0)
≤ Cθ−C1Cθ−C1+C ′1 . Rewriting this equation gives us
U˜1(C ′1) ≥
1
Cθ −C1 +C ′1
(
(Cθ −C1)U˜1(0) +C ′1
)
Finally, we note that if C ′1 < C1, then U˜1(C ′1) = 1. Together with monotonicity, this gives us
U˜1(C1) = 1
Cθ
(
(Cθ −C1 +C ′1)U˜1(C ′1) + (C1 −C ′1)U˜1(C ′1)
)
≥ 1
Cθ
(
(Cθ −C1)U˜1(0) +C ′1 + (C1 −C ′1)U˜1(C ′1)
)
=
1
Cθ
(
(Cθ −C1)U˜1(0) +C1
)
which is (1). 
NASH is not the only efficient rule that satisfies implementability. Whether a distribution is
efficient only depends on its support [see, e.g., Aziz et al., 2014]. So we can, for example, take the
support of the Nash distribution and let every agent assign her contribution to one of her most
preferred projects within the support. Since the Nash distribution is implementable, this support
contains at least one acceptable project for every agent. The allocation rule we obtain in this way
is thus implementable, although it is artificial.
Efficiency and pooling participation seem to be harder to satisfy simultaneously. We are not
aware of any rule other than NASH that satisfies these properties.
5 STRATEGYPROOFNESS AND MONOTONICITY
Even when agents do participate in the mechanism, they may be strategic and try to misrepresent
their preferences in a way that induces the mechanism to choose a distribution that gives them
higher utility. Mechanisms that are immune to strategic misrepresentation are called strategyproof.
Definition 5.1 (Strategyproofness). A mechanism is strategyproof if for all θ , θ ′ ∈ Θn with θ = θ ′
except ui , u
′
i , it holds that ui (f (θ )) ≥ ui (f (θ ′)).
In other words, strategyproofness disincentivizes an agent from misreporting her utility func-
tion ui . The other part of her type is the contribution Ci , which she might also misreport (more
precisely, underreport), but this worry is already captured by pooling participation
In many mechanism design settings, only degenerate mechanisms that ignore most of the in-
formation, such as dictatorships, are strategyproof. Our setting is no exception: Hylland’s [1980]
Theorem 2 implies that only mechanisms that allocate the entire endowment to the most preferred
projects of a single fixed agent are efficient and strategyproof, whenm ≥ 3. If we look at NASH
specifically, it can be manipulated by agents who understate their utility for projects, i.e., by re-
porting a lower utility for some project, or by labeling a project as unacceptable when it really is
acceptable. As we now show, this misrepresentation strategy can be used against every efficient
and implementable rule. For technical reasons, we additionally add a mild symmetry axiom.
Definition 5.2. A mechanism is symmetric if it assigns the same amount of funding to projects
x and y whenever they are symmetric, in the sense that swapping x and y leaves the type profile
as a whole unchanged, possibly after also renaming the agents.
Proposition 5.3. Every symmetric mechanism which is efficient and implementable can be ma-
nipulated by understating utilities, whenm ≥ 5,n ≥ 5.
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Proof. We prove the incompatibility form = 5 and n = 5, and this proof (and also the following
proofs) can be adapted to larger values by adding agents who are indifferent between all projects
or by adding projects which no one finds acceptable.
Assume that f is a symmetric mechanism which is efficient and implementable. Now consider
a profile θ with uniform contributions (Ci = 1 for all agents i ∈ N ) and the sets of acceptable
projects for each agent
({a}, {abc}, {abd}, {ace}, {de}).
We assume that each agent is indifferent between acceptable projects, so ui (x) = 1 whenever x is
acceptable to i . Let δ = f (θ ) be the distribution returned by the mechanism. By implementability
for 5, we must have δ (d) + δ (e) ≥ 1. Since the profile is symmetric under the permutation σ =
(b c)(d e), we can assume without loss of generality that δ (d) > 0. It follows thatu4(δ ) < C because
a positive amount is spent on project d , which is not one of agent 4’s acceptable projects.
Now, suppose that the fourth agent changes her utility for a from 1 to 0, i.e., marks a as unac-
ceptable. Then we get the profile θ ′ with the following sets of acceptable projects for each agent,
with agents again being indifferent between all acceptable projects:
({a}, {abc}, {abd}, {ce}, {de}).
Let δ ′ = f (θ ′) be the distribution now returned by the mechanism. By efficiency, we must have
δ ′(b) = 0 since otherwise we can redistribute resources from b to a to get a Pareto improvement.
Next, suppose that both δ ′(c) and δ ′(d) are positive, say δ ′(c) ≥ ϵ and δ ′(d) ≥ ϵ for some ϵ > 0.
Then δ ′ is Pareto dominated by the distribution obtained from δ ′ by moving ϵ from c to a and
ϵ from d to e . This contradicts efficiency of f , so δ ′(c) = 0 or δ ′(d) = 0. Since projects c and d
are symmetric in θ ′, we must have δ ′(c) = δ ′(d) = 0. Hence, δ ′ distributes the entire endowment
between projects a and e , and so u4(δ ′) = C .
Thus, agent 4 has successfully manipulated f by understating her utilities. 
Each use of the implementability axiom in this proof can easily be replaced by pooling partic-
ipation. Hence, every efficient and symmetric mechanism that satisfies pooling participation can
also be manipulated by understating utilities.
Proposition 5.3 is related to a result of Bogomolnaia et al. [2005, Prop. 6] which shows that no
mechanism can satisfy efficiency, strategyproofness, and a condition called “fair welfare share” for
dichotomous utility functions. Their proof works for cases with at least 17 agents and 5 projects.
We have focused on incentive issues for the voters, but the projects may also be strategic. The
proposers or managers of specific projects wish to acquire funding, and charities hope for large do-
nations. From this point of view, it is important that a mechanism satisfies monotonicity: a project
should not receive less funding when it becomes more popular. A failure of monotonicity may
result in perverse incentives for a project manager, such as deliberately making her own project
seem unattractive to agents in order to acquire more funding.
Definition 5.4 (Monotonicity). A mechanism f is monotonic if for every agent i ∈ N , project x ∈
A, and type profiles θ , θ ′ ∈ Θn with θ ′ = θ except u ′i (a) > ui (a), it holds that f (θ ′)(x) ≥ f (θ )(x).
So all else being equal, a project must not earn less funding if some agent states a higher utility
for it. We show that monotonicity is weaker than strategyproofness.
Proposition 5.5. If a mechanism is strategyproof, it is also monotonic.
Proof. Let θ , θ ′ ∈ Θn be two profiles with θ ′ = θ , except that u ′i (x) > ui (x) for some agent i
and project x ; let δ = f (θ ) and δ ′ = f (θ ′). We examine the restrictions strategyproofness imposes
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a b c d ui
δ1 1 · · · 3
δ2 1 · · · 3
δ3 1 · · · 3
δ4 · · · 2 6
δ5 · · · 2 6
δ6 · · · 2 6∑
3 · · 6 27
θ with A1 = {a}
a b c d ui
δ1 0.21 · · 0.79 7.46
δ2 0.6¯ 0.3¯ · · 2.31
δ3 0.6¯ · 0.3¯ · 2.31
δ4 · 0.21 0.21 1.59 7.46
δ5 · 0.23 · 1.77 6.69
δ6 · · 0.23 1.77 6.69∑
1.54 0.77 0.77 5.92 32.92
θ ′ with A′1 = {a,d}
Fig. 1. Type profiles with dichotomous utility functions used in the proof of Proposition 5.6. The last row of
each table shows the rounded distribution returned by NASH . The other rows show a rounded division of
this distribution into individual distributions (zeros omied) and the agents’ utilities. Approved projects are
highlighted in grey.
when i changes her utility function from ui to u
′
i in the profile θ and from u
′
i to ui in θ
′:∑
a,x
δ ′(a)ui (a) + δ ′(x)ui (x) ≤
∑
a,x
δ (a)ui (a) + δ (x)ui (x) and∑
a,x
δ (a)ui (a) + δ (x)u ′i (x) ≤
∑
a,x
δ ′(a)ui (a) + δ ′(x)u ′i (x).
Adding the two inequalities and cancelling identical terms gives
δ (x)(u ′i (x) − ui (x)) ≤ δ ′(x)(u ′i (x) − ui (x)).
Since u ′i (x) − ui (x) > 0 we get δ ′(x) ≥ δ (x). 
Monotonicity also seems desirable independently of any incentive concerns. For instance, voters
will trust a voting system more if they know that reporting higher utilities for a project will tend
to lead to more funding for that project. Somewhat surprisingly, NASH fails monotonicity, as the
following example shows.
Proposition 5.6. NASH violates monotonicity.
Proof. Consider the type profile θ with dichotomous utility functions represented by the sets of
approved projects of each agent ({a}, {a,b}, {a, c}, {b, c,d}, {b,d}, {c,d}) and contributionsCi = 1
for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and Ci = 2 for 4 ≤ i ≤ 6. Figure 1 illustrates this situation. We have NASH (θ ) =
3 a+6d . If agent 1 additionally approves projectd , i.e., θ ′ = θ besidesu ′1(d) = 1, we getNASH (θ ′) =
2κ a +κ b +κ c + (9− 4κ) d with κ = (7−
√
22)
3 . Hence, the contribution for project d decreased from
6 to 9 − 4κ ≈ 5.92055..., violating monotonicity. 
Since NASH is the only rule we know to be efficient and satisfying pooling participation, we do
not know if a rule exists that satisfies these two properties and is also monotonic.
6 LIMITS OF EFFICIENT MECHANISMS
In this section, we discuss the limits that we run into if we try to strengthen our notions of imple-
mentability and pooling participation as described in Section 3. Specifically, we show that these
strengthenings are incompatible with efficiency.
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First, we consider a strong implementability, wherewe require that supp(δi ) ⊆ argmax{ui (a) : a ∈
A} instead of supp(δi ) ⊆ {a ∈ A : ui (a) > 0}. In other words, each agent is only asked to spend her
contributions on her favorite projects.
Proposition 6.1. No efficient mechanism satisfies strong implementability whenm ≥ 3,n ≥ 2.
Proof. To see that strong implementability is in conflict with efficiency, consider the example
in Table 2 below. Here, both agents 1 and 2 have a pet project a and b, respectively, which the other
agent dislikes; there is also a compromise project x , which is close to optimal for both. It is best
for an agent to spend her entire contribution on her pet project independently of what the other
agent is doing. So the only allocation we can implement in the above sense is a + b, which gives
utility 1 + ε for both. But this fails to make use of the mutual interest in x : if they spent the total
endowment of 2 on x , they could achieve utility 2 each. 
ui (a) ui (b) ui (x) Ci
Agent 1 1 + ε 0 1 1
Agent 2 0 1 + ε 1 1
Table 2. Type profile with 0 < ε < 1 showing the incompatibility of strong implementability and efficiency.
The strengthening of pooling participation we discussed in Section 3 requires that ui (f (θ )) ≥
ui (f (θ−i )) +Ciumaxi , where umaxi = maxy∈A ui (y). Again, this notion of strong pooling participation
cannot be satisfied in conjunction with efficiency.
Proposition 6.2. No efficient mechanism satisfies strong pooling participation whenm,n ≥ 4.
ui (a) ui (b) ui (c) ui (x) Ci
Agent 1 2 − ε 0 0 1 1
Agent 2 0 2 − ε 0 1 1
Agent 3 0 0 2 − ε 1 1
Table 3. Type profile with 0 < ε < 0.5 used in the proof of Proposition 6.2.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists a mechanism f satisfying strong pooling
participation and efficiency.
For θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3) as in Table 3, the distribution δ = f (θ ) should only allocate resources to at
most one of a, b, and c . Otherwise, if there is any subset {y, z} ⊂ {a,b, c}, y , z with δ (y) > 0 and
δ (z) > 0, the distribution
(δ (y) − κ) y + (δ (z) − κ) z + (δ (x) + 2κ) x
with κ = min(δ (y), δ (z)) is strictly preferred by all four agents. Thus, without loss of generality,
we can assume that δ (c) = 0.
Starting with agent 1, we let the other agents join one after another and, using strong pooling
participation, derive lower bounds on the resources allocated to project x . It will turn out that after
agent 3 has joined, the mechanism would have to allocate more than the total endowment of 3 to
x in order to satisfy strong pooling participation, which is a contradiction.
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker, and Warut Suksompong 16
Let θ ′ = (θ1, θ2) and δ ′ = f (θ ′). As above, efficiency implies that either δ ′(a) = 0 or δ ′(b) = 0.
Otherwise, if δ ′(a) > 0 and δ ′(b) > 0, the distribution
(δ ′(a) − κ ′) a + (δ ′(b) − κ ′) b + (δ ′(x) + 2κ ′) x
withκ ′ = min(δ ′(a), δ ′(b)) is strictly preferred by both agents with a utility improvement of 2κ ′ε >
0. We assume that δ ′(b) = 0. Treating the case δ ′(a) = 0 requires no more than switching the order
of agents 1 and 2.
By strong pooling participation, agent 2 must get at least the same utility as if both agents acted
in an uncoordinated manner: u2(δ ′) ≥ u2(a) +C2umax2 = u2(a) + (2 − ε) = 2 − ε and with δ ′(b) = 0,
we have δ ′(x) ≥ 2−ε
u2(x ) = 2 − ε .
Thus the utility of agent 3 from δ ′ can be bounded from below by u3(δ ′) ≥ δ ′(x)u3(x) ≥ (2− ε).
Applying strong pooling participation for agent 3 yields u3(δ ) ≥ u3(δ ′) + C3umax3 ≥ (2 − ε) +
1 · (2 − ε) = 4 − 2ε . As δ (c) = 0, agent 3 can only get positive utility from project x , and thus
δ (x) = u3(δ )
u3(x ) ≥ 4 − 2ε > 3 for 0 < ε < 0.5, which exceeds the total endowment of 3. 
The reason for this incompatibility is structurally similar to that for implementability: efficiency
requires spending resources on the compromise project x , but strong pooling participation can
only be satisfied if the pet projects a, b, and c are funded.
7 CONCLUSION
We have studied preference aggregation mechanisms that can be used for funding public projects
through voluntary individual contributions. We have identified the Nash product rule (NASH ) as
a mechanism that combines efficiency with attractive incentive properties, and are excited for the
possibility of implementing such a system in the real world.
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that agents have linear utilities. In many applica-
tions, more general utilities make sense, both to capture complementarities or substitutes between
projects, and to allow agents to specify decreasing returns for additional funding of a project. For
the case of linear utilities, NASH returns a Lindahl equilibrium [Fain et al., 2016], but this equiva-
lence breaks down for more general utilities. Since Lindahl equilibria in general satisfy a kind of
implementability notion, a natural candidate for a mechanism that satisfies pooling participation
for more general utilities would be a mechanism returning Lindahl equilibria. However, our proof
technique does not easily extend to this case.
In the opposite direction, we can also further restrict the class of allowed utility functions. A nat-
ural choice is to only allow dichotomous utilities, making the setting a type of approval voting for
divisible projects, which has been well-studied [Aziz et al., 2019, Bogomolnaia et al., 2005, Duddy,
2015]. Notably, for dichotomous utility functions, our axioms of implementability and pooling
participation coincide with the strong notions we have mentioned in Section 6. Thus, the impos-
sibilities we have proved there do not apply in the dichotomous setting, and NASH becomes an
even stronger candidate mechanism, though some of the rules discussed by Aziz et al. [2019] be-
come attractive alternatives (this is particularly true for Duddy’s [2015] conditional utilitarian rule,
which returns the implementable distribution with the highest utilitarian welfare).
As mentioned before, we do not know rules other than NASH that satisfy both efficiency and
pooling participation. It would be desirable to obtain an axiomatic characterization of NASH us-
ing these kinds of axioms. Two related results are already known: In the dichotomous setting,
Guerdjikova and Nehring [2014] characterize NASH using several mild conditions (such as con-
vexity, continuity, and reinforcement) plus a core condition that is weaker than implementability
or pooling participation. Bogomolnaia et al. [2002, Prop. 6] show that NASH is the only rule that
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker, and Warut Suksompong 17
satisfies “fair group share” (again, a condition weaker than implementability or pooling participa-
tion) among rules that maximize a quantity of form
∑
i ∈N f (ui (δ )) for some function f .
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A OMITTED PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Assume for contradiction that there are two distinctU ′,U ′′ ∈ Pθ whichmaximize Fθ . As a positive
linear combination of strictly concave functions, Fθ is a strictly concave function. Hence, forU =
1
2 (U ′ +U ′′) ∈ Pθ , by strict concavity of Fθ , we have
Fθ (U ) >
1
2
(Fθ (U ′) + Fθ (U ′′)) = Fθ (U ′),
which contradicts the assumption thatU ′ maximizes Fθ over Pθ .
Now let i ∈ N . Clearly,Ui is upper bounded by Cθumaxi . For the lower bound on Ui , recall from
Theorem 4.1 that NASH is implementable. Thus the distribution NASH (θ ) is the sum of distribu-
tions δj , j ∈ N , such that δj ∈ ∆(Cj ) and δj (x) > 0 only if uj (x) > 0. In particular,ui (δi ) ≥ Ci , since
the have normalized utility functions so that the lowest positive utility of each agent is 1.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4.4
First we show that U is continuous in CN on Rn>0. Let θ ∈ Θn , θ = (u,CN ) with CN ∈ Rn>0,
(Ck
N
)k ∈N ⊆ Rn>0 converging to CN , and θk = (u,CkN ). Further, let U k = U(θk ) and U = U(θ ).
Observe that sinceCk
N
converges toCN , by Lemma 4.3, 0 < λ ≤ U ki ≤ Λ for all i and some λ,Λ > 0
and large enough k . Hence, by passing to a subsequence if necessary, we may assume that U k
converges to U ∗ for some U ∗ ∈ Pθ . Since the family of functions Fθ , Fθ k , k ∈ N, is uniformly
equicontinuous on [λ,Λ]n, it follows that Fθ k (U k ) converges to Fθ (U ∗). Moreover, asU k maximizes
Fθ k , we have Fθ k (U k ) ≥ Fθ k (U ), which converges to Fθ (U ). Hence,U ∗ maximizes Fθ , which, since
Fθ has a unique maximizer by Lemma 4.3, implies thatU
∗
= U . Hence,U k converges to U .
To prove thatUi is monotonically increasing inCi , let θ , θ ′ ∈ Θn and t > 0 such that θ ′ = (u,C ′)
withC ′1 = C1 + t andCi = C
′
i for all i ∈ N \ {1}. We show thatU1(θ ′) ≥ U1(θ ). LetU =U1(θ ) and
U ′ = U1(θ ′) and assume for contradiction thatU ′1 < U1. Then,
Fθ ′(U ′) =
∑
i ∈N
Ci logU
′
i + t logU
′
1 <
∑
i ∈N
Ci logUi + t logU1 = Fθ ′(U ),
where the inequality follows from the assumption thatU ′1 < U1 and the fact thatU is a maximizer
of Fθ . This contradicts the assumption thatU
′ maximizes Fθ ′ .
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4.5
Since Pθ is a polytope, it is an intersection of a finite number of closed half-spaces Hi . Observe
that the desired property holds for each Hi . Indeed, if the point U is in the interior of Hi , we can
take ε to be half of the distance from U to the boundary of Hi , while if U is on the boundary of
Hi , the entire ray {U + tdU | t ≥ 0} is contained in Hi and we can take ε to be any positive real
number. It follows that the desired property also holds for the intersection of the half-spaces Hi ,
which is Pθ .
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4.6
Consider the function τ : [0, 1] → R with τ (t) = Fθ (U + tdU ) and observe that τ attains its max-
imum at 0. Since Ui > 0 for all i ∈ N by Lemma 4.3, τ is differentiable at 0. Hence, the right
derivative of τ at 0 is non-positive, i.e.,
∂τ
∂t

t=0
=
∂
∂t
(∑
i ∈N
Ci log(Ui + tdUi )
) 
t=0
=
∑
i ∈N
Ci
dUi
Ui
≤ 0.
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If additionallyU − dU ∈ Pθ , the first part implies −
∑
i ∈N Ci
dUi
Ui
≤ 0, from which equality follows.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4.7
Since −α ≤ xi ≤ β , we have
xi − β−α2
 ≤ β+α2 . It follows that∑
i ∈N
Cix
2
i =
∑
i ∈N
Ci
(
xi −
β − α
2
)2
−
(
β − α
2
)2 ∑
i ∈N
Ci
≤
(
β + α
2
)2 ∑
i ∈N
Ci −
(
β − α
2
)2 ∑
i ∈N
Ci
= αβ
∑
i ∈N
Ci ,
as claimed.
A.6 Proof of Lemma 4.8
We first prove an auxiliary lemma.
Lemma A.1. Let λ∗ ∈ (0, 12 ). Then, there are ε∗ ∈ (0, 1) and t ∈ [1, 2] such that
t − λ 1 + ε
1 − ε t
2 > 1 − λ for all λ ∈ [0, λ∗] and ε ∈ (0, ε∗).
Proof. The inequality in the statement can be rewritten as λ < t−11+ε
1−ε t
2−1 . Choose an arbitrary
t ∈ (1, 1
λ∗ − 1). We have t ∈ [1, 2] and λ∗ < 11+t . Since limε→0 t−11+ε
1−ε t
2−1 =
1
1+t , we can choose
ε∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that λ∗ < t−11+ε
1−ε t
2−1 for all ε ∈ (0, ε∗). It follows that λ <
t−1
1+ε
1−ε t
2−1 for all λ ∈ [0, λ∗] and
ε ∈ (0, ε∗), as desired. 
We now proceed to prove Lemma 4.8. If µ ≤ 1, then by choosing any ε∗ ∈ (0, 1), we have
µΦ(1) ≤ Φ(1) ≤ α by assumption. Assume henceforth that µ > 1. For any ε∗ ∈ (0, 1) that we
choose later, note that if α = 0, then taking the given ε ∈ (0, ε∗) yields Φ(1) ≤ 0, so α ≥ µΦ(1)
always holds. Hence it suffices to consider α > 0. Let λ∗ := 1 − 1
µ
> 0 and choose ε∗ > 0 and
t∗ ∈ [1, 2] such that
t∗ − λ 1 + ε
1 − ε (t
∗)2 > 1 − λ
for all λ ∈ [0, λ∗] and ε ∈ (0, ε∗), which is possible by Lemma A.1.
Let λ := α−Φ(1)
α
≥ 0. Assume for the sake of contradiction that the desired conclusion is not
true, i.e., α < µΦ(1). This is equivalent to λ < λ∗. Since the function Ψ(t) := αt − Φ(t) satisfies
β(1 − ε)t2 ≤ Ψ(t) ≤ β(1 + ε)t2, by substituting t = t∗ and t = 1, we have Ψ(t∗) ≤ Ψ(1) 1+ε1−ε (t∗)2. It
follows that
Φ(t∗) = αt∗ − Ψ(t∗) ≥ α
(
t∗ − Ψ(1)
α
1 + ε
1 − ε (t
∗)2
)
= α
(
t∗ − λ 1 + ε
1 − ε (t
∗)2
)
> α(1 − λ) = Φ(1).
This contradicts the assumption that Φ(1) = maxt ∈[0,2] Φ(t).
